Publications
U.S. Economic Statecraft and Great Power Competition
James Lee (first and corresponding author) and Richard Maher. 2022. “U.S. Economic Statecraft and Great Power Competition.” Business and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2022.19
Abstract This article develops a conceptual framework for explaining variation in the United States’ economic statecraft in the Cold War and the present day, focusing on how US officials perceived the type of geoeconomic capability that its rivals possessed and the type of national security challenge that they posed. This framework specifies four ideal-type strategies on the part of the United States: economic containment, national economic competition, technological containment, and national technological competition. Analyses of U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, China, and Japan support the theory. These ideal types explain why, in the rivalry with Japan in the 1980s, the United States openly engaged in competition but did not adopt containment, relying on Voluntary Export Restraints, currency devaluation agreements, and bilateral semiconductor agreements rather than placing Japan on something historically analogous to the Commerce Department’s contemporary Entity List or targeting Japan with comprehensive export controls through an institution like CoCom. These ideal types (and the theory behind them) also explain why the United States has implemented containment measures against specific Chinese companies but has not pursued a systematic “decoupling” of the US and Chinese economies.
Foreign Aid, Development, and U.S. Strategic Interests in the Cold War
James Lee. “Foreign Aid, Development, and U.S. Strategic Interests in the Cold War.” International Studies Quarterly, 66, no. 1 (2022): sqab090. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab090
Abstract Scholars have argued that during the Cold War, the United States gave aid to its allies to reward them for maintaining an anti-Communist foreign policy rather than to promote their economic development. This finding is mostly based on data starting in the 1970s and does not accurately characterize US grand strategy before the 1970s, when the United States used aid to promote development among its allies in order to strengthen them against Communism. Using original data collected from historical editions of USAID's “Greenbook,” this article identifies the amount of unconditional aid in the United States’ foreign-aid programs in the period 1955–1970. This type of aid was designed to be politically attractive rather than to be developmentally effective. This article also develops an original measure of aid recipients’ geopolitical alignment that draws on hand coding of 466 diplomatic documents. Using these data, this article finds that there was more unconditional aid in the United States’ aid programs to neutral and nonaligned countries than in the United States’ aid programs to its allies and security partners—a counterintuitive finding that shows how different the first half of the Cold War was from the second.
US Grand Strategy and the Origins of the Developmental State
James Lee. “US Grand Strategy and the Origins of the Developmental State.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 43, no. 5 (2020): 737-761. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1579713
Abstract Scholars have credited a model of state-led capitalism called the ‘developmental state’ with producing the economic miracles of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This article examines how the developmental state was shaped by the Cold War. US grand strategy focused on accelerating economic development among allies that were under the greatest threat from Communist China and North Korea. American aid agencies became involved in the process of state-building in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and supported economic planning. I verify this claim by contrasting US policies on Taiwan with US policies in the Philippines, which faced a weaker Communist threat.
American Diplomacy and Export-Oriented Industrialization on Taiwan
James Lee. “American Diplomacy and Export-Oriented Industrialization on Taiwan.” Journal of East Asian Studies 20, no. 3 (2020): 463-483. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2020.9
Abstract Scholars have pointed to the period 1958-1962 as the beginning of Taiwan's transition to export-oriented industrialization. Although the Nationalist Party (KMT) had traditionally supported state socialism, the KMT began to oversee economic reforms in the late 1950s, setting Taiwan on the course of export-led growth under a capitalist model. Using archival materials from both the United States and Taiwan, I argue that the reforms resulted from U.S. influence on how the KMT understood the role of economic development in its grand strategy. U.S. arguments succeeded in creating political support at the highest levels of the KMT leadership for a reform-oriented faction in the economic bureaucracy. This finding shows how an aid donor can promote economic reforms even when the recipient is strategically important for the donor: although threats to enforce conditionality may not be credible, the donor can influence the recipient through persuasion.
Did Thucydides Believe in Thucydides’ Trap? The History of the Peloponnesian War and Its Relevance to U.S.-China Relations
James Lee. “Did Thucydides Believe in Thucydides’ Trap? The History of the Peloponnesian War and Its Relevance to U.S.-China Relations.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 24, no. 1 (2019): 67-86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-019-09607-0
Abstract The Peloponnesian War, a conflict between the Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, is held to be a classic example of war between a hegemon and a rising power. Graham Allison has recently coined the term “Thucydides’ Trap” to emphasize how structural forces are leading to instability in U.S.-China relations. This interpretation of history is inaccurate and reflects the influence of misleading translations. Drawing on the original Greek text of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, I argue that the concept of Thucydides’ Trap does not find support even in the case that has given it its name. Thucydides’ famous attribution of the war to “the growth of the power of Athens” actually refers to the expansion of the Athenian Empire rather than a shift in the distribution of capabilities. Structural arguments do offer valuable insights about potential sources of conflict in U.S.-China relations, but the causal mechanism has little to do with the analogy of Athens and Sparta. As exemplified by the flashpoint in the Strait of Taiwan, structural change has aggravated long-standing differences between the United States and the PRC. Beijing’s growing economic and military power has resulted in a growing threat to Taipei, which has led the United States to affirm its commitment to Taiwan’s security in ways that are inconsistent with the One-China policy. If this trend continues, it will raise the potential for a military confrontation between the great powers in East Asia.