The Geostrategic and Geoeconomic Dynamics of Great Power Competition in the Taiwan Strait
This essay examines how Taiwan’s security has been affected by great power competition between the United States and China. It argues that the geostrategic aspect of great power competition has been a destabilizing factor in the Taiwan Strait, while the geoeconomic aspect has been a stabilizing factor. Against the backdrop of the U.S.-China rivalry, the United States has cooperated more closely with Taiwan at the political and military levels, raising doubts about the United States’ adherence to the unofficial character of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Although U.S. officials have stressed that the United States is maintaining a One-China policy (under which the United States considers Taiwan’s status to be undetermined), references to Taiwan as a “country” or a “nation” have appeared in statements by U.S. officials and in U.S. legislation. These geostrategic trends could produce instability by creating the perception in Beijing that the United States is supporting Taiwan’s independence. Geoeconomic trends, on the other hand, have enhanced stability in the Taiwan Strait. The United States’ dependence on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry (and on TSMC in particular) has raised the likelihood of U.S. intervention in Taiwan’s defense in the event of a cross-strait conflict; but it has not created the perception that the United States is supporting Taiwan’s independence. Reviewing the political economy of TSMC’s relationship with the Taiwan government, TSMC’s critical position in semiconductor supply chains, and TSMC’s leading-edge manufacturing processes, this paper argues that U.S. dependence on TSMC is likely to continue for at least several years. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this paper argues that U.S. dependence on TSMC is a strategic asset rather than a strategic liability, because it yields the same benefits without incurring the same risks as a policy of strategic clarity. Taking both the geostrategic and the geoeconomic factors into consideration, this paper argues that the United States can most effectively deter Beijing from using force by deepening economic cooperation with Taiwan while proceeding cautiously on political and military cooperation.
Taiwan and the “New Cold War”
The concept of the “new Cold War” has featured prominently recent debates about the present and future of U.S.-China relations. Meanwhile, tensions in the Taiwan Strait have sparked considerable debate on the United States' relationship with Taiwan. There have not, however, been efforts to integrate these two debates to consider whether or not the Cold War analogy applies to great power competition in the Taiwan Strait. This paper analyzes the Taiwan issue in the Cold War era and the present day, highlighting both similarities and differences. Despite the vast changes in ideology and regime type in Taiwan, important aspects of this issue have remained consistent since 1949. Continuities include Taiwan's concern about abandonment; the United States' concern about entrapment; Taiwan’s geographic importance for U.S. strategic interests; the United States’ neutral position on Taiwan’s sovereignty; Taiwan positioning itself as the ideological alternative to the PRC; and Beijing claiming that independence does not have the support of the people of Taiwan. Discontinuities also exist, the most important being Taiwan’s transition to a liberal democracy, Taiwan's non-support for the One-China principle, and the strategic importance of Taiwan's semiconductor industry. Taking these similarities and differences into consideration, this paper argues that the “new Cold War” analogy applies to the Taiwan issue in ways that are both significant and limited.
Thucydides on A2/AD
Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) is a modern concept with an ancient pedigree. In his History, Thucydides explained how Athens developed an A2/AD strategy based on asymmetric capabilities that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. After the Persian Wars, Athens built a series of walls and invested heavily in its navy, while Sparta maintained its traditional strength in land forces. Under the leadership of Pericles, Athens integrated its walls and its navy into a strategy that became a critical factor in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Faced with the Spartan ultimatum in 432/1 BCE, Pericles persuaded the Athenians not to comply, arguing that Athens could prevail in a war with the Peloponnesian League by using its navy to maintain control of its empire in the Aegean. Dominance in that operational area, based on an asymmetric capability, gave the Athenians the confidence to refuse the Spartan ultimatum, leading to the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides shows how a great power’s development of A2/AD capabilities, combined with its competitor’s failure to develop countervailing capabilities, can have destabilizing consequences. His History therefore has instructive lessons for U.S. strategy in the Taiwan Strait.